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THE LAW OF TRADE PRACTICES
FOREWORD
ERviN H. POLLACK*
The legal control of trade practices is an extension of the law of
torts and originated in the judicial concept of unfair competition. Its
initial precedents were prohibitive in scope, with the courts of equity
restricting the excesses of competition and redressing commercial
wrongs created by illegal interferences with business conduct.
The economic philosophy of acceptable standards of business
practices, which established a plane of competition, was formulated
in 1887 by Henry Carter Adams. He viewed these qualitative stand-
ards as media for the reduction of excessive competition and not as
instruments which might lessen business rivalry.' In this manner,
opposition to survival and growth of business by any means gave rise
to the obligation to compete fairly.
In its judicial context, the doctrine developed from early English
cases, notably Keeble v. Hickeringill,2 "The House of Lords Trilogy,"3
and Templeton v. Russell.4 Establishing a general principle of liabil-
ity for certain species of unfair trading, the cases brought forth the
modern common law principle that a lawful business may be con-
ducted for profit without unjustified interferences of others, be they
competitors or noncompetitors.
This concept is comparable to the American doctrine of prima
facie tort, as classically presented by Mr. Justice Holmes in Aikens
v. Wisconsin:
It has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional inflic-
tion of temporal damages is a cause of action, which, as a matter
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1 "Relation of the State to Industrial Action," 1 Publications of the Am. Eco-
nomic Assn. (No. 6) 43.
2 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1706).
3 23 Q.B. 598 (1889), A.C. 25 (1892).
4 1 Q.B. 435, 715 (1893).
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of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires
a justification if the defendant is to escape.5
The prima facie tort theory attempts to overcome the restric-
tiveness of the traditional view that all actionable wrongs must con-
form to one of the various nominate torts, such as deceit, negligence,
malicious prosecution or inducing breach of contract.' Today the
concept of unfair competition includes tortious or improper conduct
irrespective of the orthodox nominate categories and covers a host of
disparate business relations. Among these activities are protection
against misrepresentation of commercial source or goods, product
simulation, and misappropriation. In addition, a wider range of un-
fair methods of competition is prohibited under federal and state
statutory law.7
This extension of business regulation fostered didactic innova-
tions. A course in trade regulation, functional in approach and cov-
ering monopoly and unfair business practices, became a standard sub-
ject in most law school curricula. In 1950, the subject matter was
given distinguishing emphasis by Professor Oppenheim in his separate
case books on federal antitrust laws and unfair trade practices.8
As the law matured, however, it assumed permissive as well as
prohibitive characteristics. Thus, the prescriptive titles of trade reg-
ulation, unfair competition, and unfair trade practices no longer
accurately described the legal concept. For this reason, a new des-
iguation, "The Law of Trade Practices," is proposed here. In con-
formity with this view, it is used for this symposium.
The phrase, "trade practices," serves a two-fold purpose. It is
descriptive of diverse business relationships, omitting an opprobious
diacritical appellation. Thus, legally permissive practices, such as
in trade secrets and trading stamps, are not summarily stigmatized by
a title connoting unethical conduct.
The exigencies of the present study prompted its expansion to
two symposia whose topics are representative of diverse trade prac-
tices, covering both the common law and statutes.
In this symposium, the initial article by Professor John C. Sted-
5 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). See also Holmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent," 8
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894); Wigmore, "The Tripartite Division of Torts," 8 Harv. L. Rev.
200 (1894).
6 See Oppenheim, "The Judicial Process in Unfair Competition," 2 Patent, TM,
and Copyright J. of Res. and Ed. 116 (Supp.) (1958).
7 E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41; Cali-
fornia Unfair Practices Act, Cal. Ann. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17000 (West 1954).
8 Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws, Cases and Comments (2d ed. 1959); Oppen-
heim, Unfair Trade Practices, Cases, Comments and Materials (1950).
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man presents the effective devices, techniques, and remedies available
to implement trade secrets as an alternative to patent protection.
A socio-economic study of trading stamps is provided by Mr.
Newell A. Clapp of the Washington, D. C., Bar. His presentation
covers such matters as relative cost, savings, and appeal of trading
stamps.
My discussion on product simulation is a critical evaluation of
aspects of secondary meaning and the jural misapplication of its
splintered theories to the copying of features of articles.
Professor James A. Rahl appraises the extension and limitation
of the doctrine of misappropriation in the I.N.S. case.
The pending Congressional bill on unfair commercial activities
is discussed by Mr. Sydney A. Diamond, one of its draftsmen for
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
The concluding article by Mr. Rudolph Callman of the New
York Bar, discusses judicial attempts to define unfair competition in
the contexts of boycotts and price wars. The inclusiveness of the
law of unfair methods of competition and its administrative vagaries
provide the framework of his study.
A forthcoming symposium will include a definitive study of false
advertising at the administrative level by Professor Irston Barnes of
Columbia University, an article on lotteries by Hon. Russell Leach and
Frank Reda of the Ohio Bar, and other writings.
In its fullest meaning, this range of subject matter reflects a
deepening sensitivity to business morality. Perhaps we may return
some day to the ethical standards embodied in the Hammurabi Code,
where heavier penalties were prescribed against merchants and public
officials than against persons of lower status or responsibility. Those
who possessed the greatest privileges would be subject to the greatest
penalties.
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